Papers
Please feel free to email me for drafts of unpublished papers/papers without links
Conversational Goals and Internet Trolls (Forthcoming in Conversations Online, edited by Patrick Connolly, Sanford Goldberg, and Jennifer Saul):
In this chapter, I argue that internet trolling offers a challenge to the idea, common in linguistic theorizing, that communication is an essentially cooperative activity. To establish this claim, I propose a characterization of trolling in terms of the goal structure of internet trolls. In particular, trolls’ goals typically involve the disruption of existing goals of their targets through the exploitation and undermining of those goals. I show that this structure is incompatible with various accounts of cooperation put forward by action theorists and language theorists.
Conversational Goals and Internet Trolls-Final Draft
Authority, Accommodation, and Illocutionary Success
The “Authority Problem” is the problem that arises when speakers who lack authority successfully perform speech acts that require speaker authority in order to be felicitous. One solution that has been offered to the Authority Problem holds that the non-authoritative speaker of a successful authoritative illocution comes to have authority through a process of presupposition accommodation. I call this solution the Authority Accommodation Analysis, or AAA. In this paper, I argue that there is no Authority Problem, and thus, no need for an AAA. The appearance of the problem relies on a conflation between the felicity of speech acts and their success. Yet a speech act can be successfully performed even in the absence of felicity. While authority is often a felicity condition for certain speech acts, I argue that it need not be a success condition. Ultimately, the consequence of my argument is that I must reject conventionalism about illocutionary success.
Conversational Cooperation Revisited (2021):
It is commonly accepted that conversation is, in some sense, cooperative. This is due in part to Paul Grice’s articulation of the Cooperative Principle, which states that participants should “make [their] conversational contributions such as is required…” (Grice 1989, 26). Yet the significance of this principle, as well as the notion of cooperation that is entailed, is up for interpretation. For example, there are several ways of understanding what kind of force the Cooperative Principle is supposed to have: it could be meant as a requirement on the behavior of speakers, a description of the way speakers behave, or an articulation of what speakers assume of one another’s contributions. I consider each of these options, and I argue that the first, which is often seen as a naïve interpretation, is worth considering. Although I ultimately reject the prescriptive interpretation of the Cooperative Principle, it offers a jumping off point for exploring other prescriptions on conversational behavior, such as the Requirement of Interlocutor Responsiveness, which I offer as an explicitly prescriptive conversational principle.
Conversational Cooperation Final Draft
Dissertation
In my dissertation, I establish a framework for investigating miscommunication. Philosophers of language are often focused on successful communication. As a result, these views are significantly limited in their ability to say much about what happens when communication goes wrong. My dissertation makes two contributions in an effort to fill this gap: first, I defend a new account of communicative context according to which contexts are relativized to individual conversational participants. This account of context can capture both idealized, successful cases of communication, as well as cases of partial or full miscommunication. Second, I argue that there are prescriptive communicative norms that govern the formation of these individualized contexts. These norms distinguish innocent miscommunications–such as the miscommunication that results when someone asks for directions to the store, but I mishear, thinking they asked for directions to the “shore”–and those miscommunications that strike us as legitimately criticizable–such as the miscommunication that occurs when a man interprets a woman’s refusal of his sexual advances as lacking linguistic content, or as expressing sexual interest.
I end my dissertation by considering whether my account is consistent with a widely accepted principle adopted by many theorists–Grice’s Cooperative Principle. I suggest that, if we adjust the principle to be a Coordinative Principle rather than a Cooperative Principle, it is.